The Ethiopian Foreign Policy and the rhetoric of the Ethiopian leaders usually reiterate about mutual benefit with all next door peoples. However contrary to this rhetoric, the no war no peace policy missed its target and went wrong by hurting the two people. Therefore, it is none of Isayas business whether Eritrea is drifting to the hands of extremists or falling apart after him. He could calculate it that did the policy go against his power or not. The state in Eritrea emerged victorious no matter what as far as his stay in power is survived. What was to be considered as defeat for him was that if the Ethiopian leaders together with Eritrean forces intended to shorten his power. This did not happen either.
I have attempted to show the no peace and no war policy applied for the last 16 years much helped the rogue state to stay in power and execute so many ugly acts against the Eritrea state, the people of Eritrea, Ethiopians and the horn at large. The state in Asmara got plentiful time and confidence to train, finance and arm all forms of terrorists to sabotage Ethiopia which is partially successful project. For example, Ethiopia is occupied in Somalia situation where Isayas worked and wanted it rightly. He also attempted to pressure Ethiopia and able to divert the mind of Ethiopian leaders from focusing at domestic politics.
Using the prolonged “no peace and no war” policy, Isayas played a destructive role in Ethiopia. He is able to keep the organization of OLF, ONLF, Gimbot 7, and so many Ethiopian outlawed groups alive inside Eritrea and helped them spread toxic and decisive propaganda against Ethiopia which ultimately produced the last protests and put the continuity of the state at crossroad.
Ethiopia were completely failed. I rather argue that the regime has decisively played negative role as it intended. Paradoxically and in a very shamefully, the Ethiopian regime who has boasted of weakening Isayas Afworqi admitted the recent public unrest which threatened the disintegration of Ethiopia were instigated by Eritrea. We accused the regime in Asmara of organizing and instigating the unrest. This is double standard. How is possible a dead regime could strike a big striving nation? The future will hold the truth regarding who is wining against whom.
Eritrea would have a new responsible leader by now and the two brotherly people could have lived peacefully. Using the prolonged policy as a cover, Isayas, however, stayed happily and the two people go migration and risked their lives on the course. Hunger and uncertainty prevailed in both peoples. Hence, what is the point of prolonging the “peace no war policy” when measured from both peoples’ benefit? I do not see anything positive of it personally. Let’s say that if Eritrea is dominated by wahabists or jihadists supported by Egypt, Saudi and Qatar, what will the Ethiopian security issue look like? Ethiopia will be trapped by sworn-in enemies.
Yosief added that with all kinds of fundamentalists and Arabists expectantly waiting by the sideline, the anarchy that will follow will make the Somali one a picnic by comparison. Eritrea is of use to Egypt so far as it functions as a destabilizing factor in ts proxy war against Ethiopia. The wahabisim project will not stop there. They will work hard to export Wahabism directly to Ethiopia. Confrontation will be the game of the day. Egypt will jump and take advantage of it. The rest will be history.
Disturbing developments are unfolding inside Eritrea which possibly could lead to civil war; it should be handled before Isayas let it go that way. The spill-over effect of the civil war to the region is massive destruction as Eritrea shares the same ethnic group with all neighboring countries.
The failure of Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan is like a bullet that ricochets through the region. Depiction of negative image will deter the foreign trade, investment and diplomacy and slow down regional economic integration. Influx of refugees will be beyond the capacity of the region too. It will increase extremism, terrorism and massive militarization in a region that is already awash with all colors of insecurity.
If that happens, Eritrea will not be different from South Sudan and Somalia, if not worst. As it is predicted that over 28 billion US Dollars will cost South Sudan if the crisis lingers for the next 3 years, there is no doubt that Eritrean issue will be more than if once drifted into the unknown.
External forces seen like in the case of South Sudan crisis, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, UAE, Al-shaba, ISIS, etc will compete to establish base lands which will further complicate future solutions. The Eritrean military can possibly be war lords like Somalia’s.
The situation inside Eritrea quietly attract these situations, no doubt as the country has Musilm lowlanders resented by the current leadership and seeking external support, the Christian highlanders divided into three divisions and are on their way to flee at intimidating number. The power balance between the highlanders and lowlanders in the military, political and security are becoming visible that none of them will emerge victorious. The rest oppressed nationalities are also waiting the game to come so that they can take advantage of it. In today’s Eritrea, the various ethnic groups are armed to face what the future holds. Hence, if the thin thread tying all peoples forcefully is cut off, war lords based on ethnicity will obviously emerge. These disturbing developments are also direct security threat to the IGAD. Therefore, the situation should be anchored at IGAD level a strategic vision where Ethiopia can play responsible and constructive role in saving Eritrea, by implication the region. Otherwise, IGAD should prepare to welcome another failed Eritrea like it did to Somalia and South Sudan recently.
Conclusions and recommended solutions.
The “no peace no war” policy gave Isayas the advantage to execute unconstrained tactics to bleed Ethiopia and Eritreans in various times though partially failed to do so. And, the various disciples of Isayas who manipulated the non-institutionalized orders of their leader and left no stone unturned to attain their parochial interests at the expense of their people. Had the mission of bombing the African leaders gathered in AU based in Addis been successful, one can guess what political and other related consequences would have faced Ethiopia.
Countless successful and unsuccessful attempts were carried out against Ethiopia since the so called no peace and no war policy. One of which is: Isayas could maintain anti-Ethiopia forces inside Eritrea, Somalia, and disputably inside Ethiopia too. These forces are still engaging Ethiopian in all war fronts: be it in hybrid war; color revolution, via attempts of terror acts and sometimes through direct war. Ethiopia tastes the bitter fruit of the policy our government used to boast of shortening Isayas’s survival.
Isayas again has invented to revenge Ethiopia: he gave military and other bases in the coastal areas of Eritrea to the stated countries deliberately to it trapped in the near future. The ‘no peace no war’ policy has kept the people of Eritrea and northern Ethiopia as hostage by creating militarized zones which dwarfed their economic development efforts.
Hence, the fate of the two people remains unpredictable. Analysed from these realities on ground, it could be summarized: the policy truly but undesirably contributed in weakening the state, created economic and social crisis inside Eritrea.
However, the leadership in Eritrea escaped well no matter what. Arguably, the leadership in Eritrea could have avoided these chaoses by producing alternative policies though. Isayas’s hostile foreign policy alienated Eritrean from the globalized world not the policy of ‘no peace no war’. Expectantly, Essayas used the policy as a cover to execute his evil policies inside and outside the country. Shortly, it gave him so much time to stay in power. The northern part of Ethiopia sadly is dwarfed economically. Thus, exodus is mainly from Eritrea and Tigrai, as a result.
In fact, Isayas personally extended his power and now he is gaining much material and cash to survive more. The policy thus ended up by trapping (a policy which has sandwiched the two brotherly people) the two people in dilemma. Let me conclude by the advice of my Eritrean brother Yosief again: at a security level, any encirclement of Ethiopia directly translates into encirclement of Eritrea. Precisely, thus Isayas’s policy should be picked as common enemy of the two countries; the two people must coordinate their hands and avoid him at any cost before too late to be drowned into unknown situations.